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I.

INTRODUCTION

Impunity remains one of the greatest challenges facing international
peace and security today. As Eli M. Rosenbaum, Director of the Office of
Special Investigations, Criminal Division, United States Department of
Justice, notes,
[T]he twentieth century has been termed “The Age of
Atrocity” and also “The Age of Impunity.” It isn't hard to
see why. Between 1900 and 1987 alone, it is estimated that
governments and government-like organizations murdered
fully 169 million civilians. That deeply shocking statistic
speaks volumes about the urgent need for systematic and
aggressive law enforcement action to apprehend and bring
to justice the perpetrators of war crimes, genocide and
crimes against humanity.1
A recent example of impunity’s lingering existence is the events occurring in Kenya after the 2007 presidential elections. Kenya recently became embroiled with the International Criminal Court (ICC) over the continuing impunity for the high-ranking officials responsible for the violence
that took place after the 2007 elections, which left the state on the brink of
civil war.2
The 2007 post-election violence claimed the lives of 1200 Kenyans
with another 500,000 being forced from their homes.3 The violence broke
out after President Mwai Kibaki, who was up for reelection, and his supporters were accused of trying to rig the election in President Kibaki’s favor
against his opponent, Raila Odinga.4 Luis Moreno Ocampo, the ICC Prose1.
Eli M. Rosenbaum, Remarks, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1667, 1667 (2006) (footnote
omitted); see also Roy W. Gutman, Remarks at the Dinner for Boston Area International
Law Professors at New England School of Law, 6 NEW ENG. INT'L & COMP. L. ANN. 1, 2
(2000).
2.
Kenya Election Violence: ICC Names Suspects, BBC NEWS, Dec. 15, 2010,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-11996652.
3.
Id.
4.
Id.
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cutor, said that police were then given permission to use excessive force in
retaliation for the election tampering, and a vigilante group was formed to
attack civilians.5 These attacks were linked with long-standing ethnic and
economic conflicts, which were inflamed by political divisions in 2007.6
There were reports that whole communities became fractured and some
civilians were given crude weapons to use against their fellow neighbors.7
Some of these newly-armed civilians were allegedly paid by high-ranking
Kenyan politicians.8 One of the worst massacres occurred in a church,
where around one hundred people attempted to flee the violence only to be
killed when the church was set on fire.9 These actions have been called
crimes against humanity by the international community.10
It was only after United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan
brokered a peace deal between the two presidential camps that the violence
ended.11 Part of the peace agreement’s terms had Kibaki and Odinga enter a
power sharing arrangement with Odinga being appointed prime minister
while Kibaki remained president.12 The peace agreement also included a
provision where those responsible for the violence would be brought to
justice either in Kenya or at the ICC in The Hague.13 Nevertheless, in the
three years after the post-election violence, Kenyan officials have moved to
block any tribunals set up to address the crimes, and no one has been indicted by Kenyan officials to date.14
However, with news of the ICC launching its own investigation proprio motu, or by its own motion—a first in the history of the court15—and
the impending indictment of high-level Kenyan officials, President Kibaki
announced on December 13, 2010 that Kenya would begin its own investigation.16 Some have criticized this move as purely a way to prevent highranking officials from being tried at The Hague.17
Nevertheless, on December 15, 2010, the ICC publically announced
six indictments for crimes against humanity committed in the wake of the

5.
Id.
6.
Id.
7.
Kenya Election Violence: ICC Names Suspects, supra note 2.
8.
Id.
9.
Id.
10.
Id.
11.
Id.
12.
Kenya Election Violence: ICC Names Suspects, supra note 2.
13.
Id.
14.
Id.
15.
Slava Kuperstein, Kenyans Question ICC Authority, HUM. RTS. BRIEF, Oct. 13,
2010, available at http://hrbrief.org/2010/10/kenyans-question-icc-authority/.
16.
Kenya Election Violence: ICC Names Suspects, supra note 2.
17.
Id.
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2007 post-election violence.18 Those who were indicted included: Uhuru
Kenyatta, Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister; Francis Kirimi
Muthaura, Secretary to the Cabinet; Mohammed Hussein Ali, former police
chief; Henry Kosgey, Minister for Industrialisation; William Ruto, suspended Education Minister; and Joshua Arap Sang, radio executive.19
However, many Kenyans believe the prosecutions are critical in combating the firmly rooted culture of impunity in the state.20 The question
nevertheless remains whether the accused will voluntarily appear before the
ICC or, like many before them, if they will continue to evade justice.21
An older, but more well-known, example of the consequences of impunity is the Lockerbie incident. A few days before Christmas of 1988, Pan
Am Flight 103 was scheduled to fly from London’s Heathrow Airport to
New York’s JFK when it was destroyed by a bomb over Lockerbie, Scotland.22 There were 243 passengers and eleven crew members on the plane;
everyone on board was killed.23 A year later, another bomb blew up the
French UTA Flight 772 over the Sahara desert, which killed 172 people,
including the wife of the U.S. ambassador to Chad.24 The modes and methods of bombing between the two flights were the same.25
Three years and over 15,000 witness testimonies later, two Libyan nationals were indicted in the Pan Am bombing: Abdel Basset Ali al-Megrahi,
a Libyan intelligence officer, and Al Amin Khalifah Fhimah, a manager at
Libyan Arab Airlines.26 Requests from the United States, the United Kingdom, and France for both Pan Am Flight 103 and UTA Flight 772 to extradite these men were ignored by Libya, resulting in United Nations (UN)

18.
Id.
19.
Id.
20.
Id.
21.
Kenya Election Violence: ICC Names Suspects, supra note 2.
22.
Rt. Hon. Colin Boyd, Police Investigations of “Politically Sensitive” or High
Crime Profile Crimes: The Lockerbie Trial, Presented at the International Society for the
Reform of Criminal Law’s 15th International Conference, 2-3 (Aug. 28, 2001),
http://www.isrcl.org/Papers/Boyd.pdf.
23.
Clipper Maid of the Seas: Remembering Those on Flight 103, PAN AM (20012009), http://www.panamair.org/accidents/lockerbievictims.htm (noting that until September
11th, 2001, the Pan Am bombing was the deadliest terrorist attack against U.S. citizens in
history). See also Boyd, supra note 22.
24.
Press Release, Crowell & Morning, LLP, Court Awards U.S. Victims More
Than $6 Billion for 1989 Libyan Terrorist Bombing of French Airliner That Killed 170
People
Over
African
Desert
(Jan.
15,
2008),
available
at
http://www.crowell.com/PDF/PressReleases/2008-Jan_UTA-Flight-772_PressRelease_Crowell-Moring.pdf.
25.
Paul Reynolds, UTA 772: The forgotten flight, BBC NEWS (Aug. 19, 2003),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/3163621.stm.
26.
Boyd, supra note 22, at 6.
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sanctions.27 Six Libyans were charged, tried, and convicted in absentia,
meaning in the absence of the accused, by French courts for the UTA
bombing when Libya again refused to extradite their nationals.28 It took
nearly fifteen years for those responsible for Pan Am Flight 103 and UTA
Flight 772 to be brought to justice.29
However, in terms of combating impunity, the Lockerbie incident is
considered a success.30 It is unknown how the indictments handed out for
the six high-ranking Kenyan officials in the state’s post-election violence
will play out, but they too have the potential of ending positively by having
those most responsible for the crimes against humanity brought to justice,
either in Kenya or before the ICC. Not all situations will be as lucky. Therefore, the existing international legal framework must do a better job of preventing impunity. This article seeks to lay out possible changes to current
international law that are necessary to combat impunity, particularly regarding the international crime of terrorism.
Part II will lay out what terrorism is and the obstacles the international
community faces in achieving a singular definition for the word. Part II will
also discuss the different approaches various conventions have taken in
defining terrorism and will propose a concise definition the international
community may want to adopt. Part II will end with calling for terrorism to
be included as a crime against humanity or a war crime depending on the
situation. Part III will describe the international legal duty to extradite or
prosecute, and its elevation to a non-derogable, jus cogens, norm in international law. Part IV will then explain universal jurisdiction and discuss how
the crime of terrorism is a crime under for universal jurisdiction may apply.
Part V will link all of the concepts in Parts II through IV and propose a
novel legal framework the international community could adopt in combating impunity for the crime of terrorism. Part VI will offer a brief conclusion
and present one argument available to end impunity for terrorists.
II.

TERRORISM

Even before the attacks of September 11th, 2001, terrorism was described as the greatest threat to world peace.31 If this was true before the
27.
Id.; see S.C. Res. 731, ¶ 1-6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/731 (Jan. 21, 1992).
28.
Reynolds, supra note 25.
29.
See Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Lifts Sanctions Imposed
on Libya After Terrorist Bombings of Pan Am 103, UTA 772, U.N. Press Release SC/7868
(Dec. 9, 2003), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2003/sc7868.doc.htm.
30.
Those responsible for the Lockerbie incident were, after all, eventually held
responsible. See id.
31.
Bradley Larschan, Legal Aspects to the Control of Transnational Terrorism: An
Overview, 13 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 117, 117-18 (1986); Leah M. Campbell, Comment, De-
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terrorist attacks on 9/11, then it is even truer today. For example, terrorist
activities have been increasing over the past few decades.32 In 1968, there
were 165 reported terrorist incidents, but by 1984 there were over 600 terrorist events in that year alone.33 At least one scholar found that the total
number killed by terrorist activities between 1970 and 1995 was around
8500, while leaving another 15,000 injured.34 The September 11th attacks
left some 3000 civilians dead in the name of terrorism.35 Despite the frequency of terrorist activities, the international community cannot come to a
consensus on what terrorism actually is. The rest of this section will explain
the obstacles to an accepted definition of terrorism and will offer a definition the international community can likely agree upon.
A.

DEFINING TERRORISM

Few issues have so divided the international community as the definition of one word: terrorism. For instance, a 2003 U.S. Army study conducted by Dr. Jeffrey Record found 109 definitions of terrorism with
twenty-two different elements of the term.36 Moreover, Walter Lacquer,
who is an expert in terrorism, noted over a hundred definitions for the word
terrorism and found that most states can only agree that “terrorism . . . involves violence or the threat of violence.”37
Despite this lack of agreement over the term terrorism, it is absolutely
vital that the international community come to a consensus on the word’s
meaning in order to properly prevent, condemn, and punish terrorist activities.

fending Against Terrorism: A Legal Analysis of the Decision to Strike Sudan and Afghanistan, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1067, 1069 (2000).
32.
See Sabrina R. Der Bagdasarian, Note, The Need for International Cooperation
to Suppress Terrorism: the United States and Germany as an Example, 19 N.Y.L. SCH. J.
INT'L & COMP.L. 265, 265 (1999); Jürgen Meyer, German Criminal Law Relating to International Terrorism, 60 U. COLO. L. REV. 571, 571 (1989).
33.
See JOHN T. ROURKE, INTERNATIONAL POLITICS ON THE WORLD STAGE 406 (5th
ed. 1995).
34.
See id.
35.
See Margaret Talbot, The Lives They Lived: 3,225 (At Last Count), D. Sept. 11,
2001;
Order
of
Magnitude,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Dec.
30,
2001),
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/12/30/magazine/the-lives-they-lived-3225-at-last-count-dsept-11-2001-order-of-magnitude.html?scp=5&sq=The+lives+they+lived&st=nyt
(noting
that 3225 people were killed in the September 11th terrorist attacks).
36.
JEFFREY RECORD, BOUNDING THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR 6 (Univ. Press of the
Pacific 2004).
37.
WALTER LAQUEUR, THE NEW TERRORISM: FANATICISM AND THE ARMS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION 6 (Oxford University Press 1999); see also RECORD, supra note 36.
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OBSTACLES TO DEFINING TERRORISM

To fully end impunity for terrorism, the world community must first
agree on the definition of what terrorism and a terrorist is. Experts have
noted that “[a]n objective definition of terrorism is not only possible; it is
also indispensible to any serious attempt to combat terrorism. Lacking such
definition, no coordinated fight against international terrorism can every
really get anywhere.”38
Essentially, the tension stems from the oft-repeated statement that one
man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter.39 Some note that
there are others who say that a definition of terrorism is
necessary, but that such a definition must serve their own
political ends []. States that sponsor terrorism are trying to
persuade the international community to define terrorism in
such a way that the particular terror groups they sponsor
would be outside the definition – and thus to absolve them
from all responsibility for supporting terrorism. Countries
such as Syria, Libya, and Iran have lobbied for such a definition, according to which “freedom fighters” would be
given carte blanche permission to carry out any kind of attacks they wanted, because a just goal can be pursued by all
available means.40
The difficulty in using the term terrorism began in 1899 when the laws
of war were first codified.41 The Martens Clause was seen as a compromise
between those who considered the francs-tireurs to be unlawful combatants, such as the Great Powers, and others, such as the smaller nation-states,
that believed this group should be seen as lawful combatants.42
In the twentieth century, the tension over who is considered a lawful
combatant became evident in the 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Convention of August 12, 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts passed in 1977.43 Specifically, Article 1,
38.
Boaz Ganor, Defining Terrorism: Is One Man’s Terrorist Another Man’s Freedom Fighter?, 3:4 POLICE PRAC. & RES. 287, 288 (2002).
39.
See id.
40.
Id.
41.
See Vladimir Pustogarov, Fyodor Fyodorovich Martens (1845-1909) — A Humanist of Modern Times, INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS, June 30, 1996, at 300-31, available
at http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/57jn52.htm.
42.
Id.
43.
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflict (Protocol II), Dec. 12,
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 606, http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/475?OpenDocument.
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paragraph 4 does not precisely define who is a legitimate combatant.44 Importantly, lawful combatants have a right to resist occupation, whereas unlawful combatants, like terrorists, do not.45 This means that certain resistance movements could be considered terrorists, while others may not.46
C.

DEFINITIONS OF TERRORISM

Because of the disagreement on the definition of terrorism, the international community adopted a series of smaller conventions and resolutions
that define various parts of terrorism. Attempts have been made to cure this
problem–the best of which is the proposed Comprehensive Convention on
International Terrorism.47
1.

U.N. Proposed Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism

The U.N. has been working on a comprehensive definition of terrorism
since 2000, but discussions have since stalled.48 This is also not the first
attempt by the international community to issue a draft terrorism convention.49 However, the most recent U.N. Proposed Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism defines terrorism as
[a]ny person commits an offence within the meaning of this
Convention if that person, by any means, unlawfully and
intentionally, causes: (a) Death or serious bodily injury to
any person; or (b) Serious damage to public or private
44.
See id. at art.1, ¶ 4.
45.
See id.; see also Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on
Land art. 2, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, 1 Bevans 247.
46.
The U.S. government considers HAMAS a foreign terrorist organization, but to
others it is a legitimate political party and resistance movement. See Hamas (Islamic Resistance
Movement),
NAT’L
COUNTERTERRORISM
CENTER,
http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/hamas.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2011).
47.
Andrea Gioia, The U.N. Conventions on the Prevention and Suppression of
International Terrorism, in INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN COUNTER-TERRORISM: THE
UNITED NATIONS AND REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM 4 (Giuseppe Nesi ed., 2006).
48.
See Ad Hoc Comm., Rep. on its 6th Sess., Jan. 28-Feb. 1, 2002, U.N. Doc.
A/57/37, annex II, art. 2.1 (Feb. 11, 2002); Ad Hoc Committee on Assembly, Resolution
51/10 (Apr. 15, 2011) (noting that the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee was encouraged
by the progress made on the proposed Convention, despite the fact it has been in the works
for over a decade).
49.
See, e.g., Draft Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Certain Acts
of International Terrorism, Sept. 25, 1972, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/L.850; Reuven Young, Defining
Terrorism: The Evolution of Terrorism as a Legal Concept in International Law and Its
Influence on Definitions of Domestic Legislation, 19 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 22, 38
(2006).
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property, including a place of public use, a State or government facility, a public transportation system, an infrastructure facility or the environment; or (c) Damage to
property, places, facilities, or systems referred to in paragraph 1 (b) of this article, resulting or likely to result in major economic loss, when the purpose of the conduct, by its
nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international organization to do or
abstain from doing any act.50
Although the U.N. has considered this proposed convention for over ten
years, confusion over whether armed forces or those fighting for selfdetermination could also be branded as terrorists have halted the negotiations.51
Several possible exceptions to the proposed definition have been offered in order to mitigate states’ concerns over whether the definition would
apply to states’ armed forces or those involved with self-determination.52
These proposed exceptions, or reservations, are as follows:
1. Nothing in this Convention shall affect other rights, obligations and responsibilities of States, peoples and individuals under international law, in particular the purposes
and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and international humanitarian law.
2. The activities of armed forces during an armed conflict,
as those terms are understood under international humanitarian law, which are governed by that law, are not governed by this Convention.
3. The activities undertaken by the military forces of a
State in the exercise of their official duties, inasmuch as
they are governed by other rules of international law, are
not governed by this Convention.
4. Nothing in this article condones or makes lawful otherwise unlawful acts, nor precludes prosecution under other
laws.53

50.
Id.
51.
See Thalif Deen, U.N. Member States Struggle to Define Terrorism, INTER
PRESS SERV., July 25, 2005, http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=29633.
52.
Ad Hoc Comm., Rep. on its 6th Sess., supra note 48, at annex IV, art. 18.
53.
Id.
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Members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference proposed their
own possible reservations to the convention.54 These reservations included:
2. The activities of the parties during an armed conflict, including in situations of foreign occupation, as those terms
are understood under international humanitarian law, which
are governed by that law, are not governed by this Convention.
3. The activities undertaken by the military forces of a
State in the exercise of their official duties, inasmuch as
they are in conformity with international law, are not governed by this Convention.55
In 2004, the U.N. Secretary General convened the High-Level Panel
on Threats, Challenges and Change in order to bypass the gridlock and,
through the proposed Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism, adopt a description of what constitutes terrorist activities.56 That description that emerged was
any action, in addition to actions already specified by the
existing conventions on aspects of terrorism, the Geneva
Conventions and Security Council resolution 1566 (2004),
that is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants, when the purpose of such an
act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or
to compel a Government or an international organization to
do or to abstain from doing any act.57
However, the plea to include this political definition of terrorism into the
text of the proposed convention was ultimately rejected.58 The main chal-

54.
Id.
55.
Id.
56.
Rep. of the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, 59th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004);
Young, supra note 49, at 41.
57.
Rep. of the High Level Panel on Threats, supra note 56, at ¶ 164.
58.
ROBERT P. BARNIDGE, NON-STATE ACTORS AND TERRORISM: APPLYING THE
LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY AND THE DUE DILIGENCE PRINCIPLE 1 (T.M.C. Asser Press
2007); Javier Rupérez, The UN’s Fight Against Terrorism: Five Years After 9/11, in REAL
INSTITUTO ELCANO OF SPAIN (2006), available at http://www.un.org/terrorism/ruperezarticle.html.

2011]

THE AGE OF IMPUNITY

85

lenge to adding the above language was that it lacked the requisite requirements to be incorporated as something found in international criminal law.59
Nevertheless, it seems that the Proposed Comprehensive Convention
on International Terrorism offers the best and most complete definition of
terrorism to date. Moreover, whatever fears or concerns states have as to the
overreaching definition of terrorism can be somewhat mitigated by reservations to the proposed convention.60 However, other definitions of terrorism
appear in other conventions or resolutions, and these shall be discussed
below.61
2.

U.N. General Assembly Resolutions

Some U.N. organs have offered several definitions of terrorism.62 For
example, in 1972, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) passed
its first resolution concerning terrorism.63 Later, the United Nations Declaration to Supplement the 1994 Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, which is non-binding, annexed U.N. General Assembly
Resolution 51/210 and offered its own condemnation of terrorist activities.64 More specifically, Resolution 49/60 defines terrorism as:
1. The States Members of the United Nations solemnly reaffirm their unequivocal condemnation of all acts, methods
and practices of terrorism, as criminal and unjustifiable,
wherever and by whomever committed, including those
which jeopardize the friendly relations among States and
peoples and threaten the territorial integrity and security of
States;

59.
Carlos Fernando Diaz-Paniagua, coordinator of the negotiations on the proposed
Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism, commented that a comprehensive
definition of terrorism must be found in criminal law treaty principles, meaning it “must
have ‘legal precision, certainty and fair-labelling of the criminal conduct - all of which emanate from the basic human rights obligation to observe due process.’” BARNIDGE, supra note
58, at 17.
60.
See Ad Hoc Comm., Rep. on its 6th Sess., supra note 48, at Annex IV, art. 18.
61.
See infra Part II.C.2-6 and accompanying text.
62.
Rep. of the Preparatory Comm. for the Establishment of an Int’l Crim. Ct., 51st
sess., Mar. 25-Apr.12, Aug. 12-30, 1996, U.N. Doc. A/51/49; GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No.
49, Vol. 1 (1998).
63.
See G.A. Res. 3034 (XXVII), U.N. Doc A/Res/3034 (XXVII), GAOR, 27th
Sess.
(Dec.
18,
1972),
available
at
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/27/ares3034%28xxvii%29.pdf; Young, supra note
49, at 33.
64.
See Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, G.A. Res.
49/60, U.N. Doc. A/RES/49/60 (Dec. 9, 1994).
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2. Acts, methods and practices of terrorism constitute a
grave violation of the purposes and principles of the United
Nations, which may pose a threat to international peace and
security, jeopardize friendly relations among States, hinder
international cooperation and aim at the destruction of human rights, fundamental freedoms and the democratic
bases of society;
3. Criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of
terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular
persons for political purposes are in any circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any other
nature that may be invoked to justify them.65
3.

U.N. Security Council Resolutions

The United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1566 in 2004,
which denounced terrorist acts and labeled them as
criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with
the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking
of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in
the general public or in a group of persons or particular
persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or
an international organization to do or to abstain from doing
any act, which constitute offences within the scope of and
as defined in the international conventions and protocols
relating to terrorism, are under no circumstances justifiable
by considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological,
racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature.66
Despite that this language seemingly represents a working definition of
terrorism, Brazilian Ambassador Ronaldo Mota Sardenberg rejected this
was meant to be an actual definition of the term.67
4.

Terrorist Bombings Convention

The International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings was passed in 1997.68 Because bombings in recent years have been
65.
66.
67.

Id.
S.C. Res. 1566, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1566 (Oct. 8, 2004).
Young, supra note 49, at 45.
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over 70% of terrorist attacks, this convention deserves special recognition.69
Article 2(1) of the Convention defines terrorist bombings as
[a]ny person commits an offence within the meaning of this
Convention if that person unlawfully and intentionally delivers, places, discharges or detonates an explosive or other
lethal device in, into or against a place of public use, a
State or government facility, a public transportation system
or an infrastructure facility:
a) With the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury; or
b) With the intent to cause extensive destruction of such a
place, facility or system, where such destruction results in
or is likely to result in major economic loss.70
It should be noted that certain acts committed by a state’s armed forces,
acts intended to further self-determination efforts, and acts carried out during armed conflicts are specifically excluded from this definition.71 Article
19 states,
1. Nothing in this Convention shall affect other rights, obligations and responsibilities of States and individuals under international law, in particular the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international
humanitarian law.
2. The activities of armed forces during an armed conflict,
as those terms are understood under international humanitarian law, which are governed by that law, are not governed by this Convention, and the activities undertaken by
military forces of a State in the exercise of their official duties, inasmuch as they are governed by other rules of international law, are not governed by this Convention.72

68.
International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, Dec. 15,
1997, 2149 U.N.T.S. 256. [hereinafter International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism Bombings]
69.
Young, supra note 49, at 50.
70.
International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings art. 2(1),
Dec. 15, 1997, 2149 U.N.T.S. 256.
71.
International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism Bombings art. 19,
Dec. 15, 1997, 2149 U.N.T.S. 256; Young, supra note 49, at 51.
72.
International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism Bombings art. 19,
Dec. 15, 1997, 2149 U.N.T.S. 256.
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Terrorist Financing Convention

The International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of
Terrorism labels the financing of terrorism as a criminal act committed by
anyone who
by any means, directly or indirectly, unlawfully and willfully, provides or collects funds with the intention that they
should be used or in the knowledge that they are to be used,
in full or in part, in order to carry out . . . [an] act intended
to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to
any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities
in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such
act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or
to compel a government or an international organization to
do or to abstain from doing any act.73
6.

Nuclear Terrorism Convention

The United Nations International Convention for the Suppression of
Acts of Nuclear Terrorism defines nuclear terrorism as a crime where
[a]ny person commits an offence within the meaning of this
Convention if that person unlawfully and intentionally:
(a) Possesses radioactive material or makes or possesses a
device:
(i) With the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury;
or
(ii) With the intent to cause substantial damage to property
or to the environment;
(b) Uses in any way radioactive material or a device, or
uses or damages a nuclear facility in a manner which releases or risks the release of radioactive material:
(i) With the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury;
or

73.
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism art.
2(1), Dec. 9, 1999, 2178 U.N.T.S. 197.
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(ii) With the intent to cause substantial damage to property
or to the environment; or
(iii) With the intent to compel a natural or legal person, an
international organization or a State to do or refrain from
doing an act.74
However, as with other conventions, the Nuclear Terrorism Convention excludes from the definition of nuclear terrorism the activities of armed
forces during an armed conflict in Article 4.75 Article 4 also makes clear
that the convention in no way approves of the use of force or the legitimacy
of nuclear weapons in their entirety.76 This convention also concerns itself
with environmental and property damage.77
D.

A COMPREHENSIVE DEFINITION OF TERRORISM

Despite arguments to the contrary, there is an accepted definition of
terrorism emerging in international law.78 Of special significance is the
High-Level Panel’s definition of terrorism, which includes the use of force
against civilians by states.79
The UN Proposed Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism poses the best definition of terrorism to date.80 Whatever qualms states
have over the definition may be readily solved by the proposed reservations
mentioned above, none of which contravene the true definition of terrorism.81 Therefore, the concise definition of terrorism that should be adopted
by the international community is as follows: the unlawful, intentional killing, intentional causing of serious bodily harm, or intentional causing of
serious damage to public and/or private property for the purpose of intimidating the public or compelling a state’s government to pursue, or not pursue, a certain course of conduct.

74.
International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism art.
2, Apr. 13, 2005, 2445 U.N.T.S. 89 (not yet in force).
75.
Id. at art. 4.
76.
Id.
77.
Young, supra note 49, at 52.
78.
DAVID WEISSBRODT & CONNIE DE LA VEGA, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 237 (Univ. of Pa. Press 2007).
79.
Id.
80.
See Ad Hoc Comm., Rep. on its 6th Sess., supra note 48.
81.
See id. at annex IV, art. 18.
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TERRORISM AS A CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY OR A WAR CRIME
DEPENDING ON THE CASE

Although not completely accepted yet in international law, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell called the terrorist attacks on September 11th not
just “a crime against the United States, but a crime against humanity.”82
The next section will attempt to prove Mr. Powell’s assertion that terrorism
is indeed either a crime against humanity or a war crime, depending on the
situation.
1.

Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes

Crimes against humanity are usually carried out during an armed conflict, although many scholars have argued that they need not necessarily be
committed in that context.83 The Rome Statute of the ICC defines crimes
against humanity as
any of the following acts when committed as part of a
widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack:
(a) Murder;
(b) Extermination;
(c) Enslavement;
(d) Deportation or forcible transfer of population;
(e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical
liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international
law;
(f) Torture;
(g) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced
pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity;
(h) Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious,
gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds that are
82.
CNN Larry King Live: Interview with Colin Powell (CNN television broadcast
Nov. 26, 2001) (transcript available at http://www.cnn.com/transcripts/0111/26/lkl.02.html).
83.
WEISSBRODT & DE LA VEGA, supra note 78, at 227.
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universally recognized as impermissible under international
law, in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph
or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court;
(i) Enforced disappearance of persons;
(j) The crime of apartheid;
(k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally
causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.84
War crimes, however, are different than crimes against humanity. The
Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 identified “violations of the laws or
customs of war” that invoke individual criminal responsibility.85 The four
Geneva Conventions consider war crimes as certain grave breaches committed against protected persons, mainly civilians.86 These grave breaches
include:
willful killing, torture, or inhuman treatment, including biological experimentation; willfully causing great suffering or
serious injury to body or health; unlawful deportation or
transfer; unlawful confinement or compulsion to serve in
the forces of a hostile Power; willfully depriving a protected person of the rights of fair and regular trial; taking of
hostages; and extensive destruction and appropriation of
property not otherwise justified by military necessity and
carried out unlawfully.87
Moreover, Additional Protocol I discusses grave breaches committed
in the context of international armed conflicts.88 These include:
(a) making the civilian population . . . the object of attack;
(b) launching an indiscriminate attack affecting the civilian
population . . . [knowing it] will cause excessive loss of
life, injury to civilians, or damage to civilian objects; . . .
(f) unjustifiable delay in the repatriation of prisoners of war
or civilians; (g) practices of apartheid and other inhuman
[treatment], based on racial discrimination; (h) [defacing]
84.
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 7, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
85.
WEISSBRODT & DE LA VEGA, supra note 78, at 225.
86.
Id. at 226.
87.
See id.
88.
Id. at 226-27.
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historic monuments, works of art, or places of worship that
constitute the cultural or spiritual heritage of people the object of attack . . . and (i) depriving protected persons of the
rights of fair and regular trial.89
Lastly, the Rome Statue of the ICC makes clear that “violations of the
laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict” can be committed during situations not amounting to armed conflicts, and also considers crimes of sexual violence, such as forced pregnancy or forced sterilization, as war crimes.90
2.

Terrorism Is a Crime Against Humanity or a War Crime

Terrorist activities satisfy all the required elements to be a crime
against humanity. First, some terrorist acts, like those involved in September 11th, are part of a widespread attack against a civilian population (in the
September 11th case, the U.S. population).91 These acts need not be carried
out during a traditional armed conflict, although this is often the case with
many terrorist incidents.92 Terrorist attacks may also be long-term and systematic in nature, as is the case in the September 11th attacks, beginning
with the first World Trade Center bombings in 1993, along with two U.S.
embassy bombings in 1998, and culminating in the 9/11 attacks.93 In particular, the two attacks against the World Trade Center were targeted
against only civilians because no military personnel or operations were
housed there.94 In fact, Al-Qaeda founder Osama bin Laden, in an interview
in May 1998 with John Miller, stated that “[w]e do not differentiate between those dressed in military uniforms and civilians; they are all targets
in this fatwa.”95
89.
Id.
90.
Rome Statute, supra note 84, at art. 8.
91.
B. Welling Hall, Addendum Relating to Self-Defense, ASIL Insights: Terrorist
Attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L L (Sep. 2001),
http://www.asil.org/insigh77.cfm.
92.
EKATERINA STEPANOVA, TERRORISM IN ASYMETRICAL CONFLICT: IDEOLOGICAL
AND STRUCTURAL ASPECTS, at vii, 1 (2008).
93.
First Strike: Global Terror in America, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (Feb.
26, 2008), http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2008/february/tradebom_022608.
94.
John Moore, The Evolution of Islamic Terrorism: An Overview, PBS (last visited Oct. 11, 2011), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/target/etc/modern.html
(according to Osama bin Laden, Al Qaeda’s purpose was to kill U.S. civilians); Letter from
Osama bin Laden to the American People (Nov. 24, 2002), available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/nov/24/theobserver) (explaining why Al Qaeda
targets American civilians).
95.
Interview: Osama bin Laden, FRONTLINE (May 1998), available at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/who/interview.html#video;
see
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Second, some terrorist acts, like those involved in 9/11, certainly involve murder, which is one of the crimes listed in the Rome Statute as a
crime against humanity.96 Moreover, terrorist incidents not amounting to
murder may still be considered a crime against humanity if they fall under
the category of “other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally
causing great suffering, or serious injury . . . .”97 In light of this, if the
events of September 11th do not constitute crimes against humanity, it is
hard to imagine what else fits the definition.
In certain situations, however, terrorism may be properly categorized
as a war crime instead of being categorized as a crime against humanity.
Examples of this include when attacks take place against civilian property.98
Terrorism could also be considered a war crime during hostage-taking
situations, other situations where terrorists make civilian populations the
object of the attack, or when knowing such an attack will cause “excessive
loss of life, injury to civilians, or damage to civilian objects.”99
Having defined terrorism and shown that it should be categorized as a
crime against humanity or war crime, it is now necessary to turn to the issue
of who has jurisdiction to prosecute these crimes, and whether states are
under a duty to do so.
III.
A.

AUT DEDERE AUT JUDICARE: THE DUTY TO EXTRADITE OR
PROSECUTE

EXTRADITION GENERALLY

Terrorist attacks often involve foreign nationals committing unlawful
acts on foreign territory. In such cases, states usually do not have the power
to prosecute persons for crimes occurring beyond their sovereign territory.100 As a result, when an accused or convicted criminal flees from one
state to another, interstate cooperation is necessary to guarantee that the
fugitive is brought back.101 Typically, extradition agreements, which are
procedures of request and consent, are used in these cases.102 Extradition
agreements usually reflect a state’s desire to engage in limiting crime, if
only because many states do not want to become a place of criminal refalso Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Sept. 2,
1998).
96.
Rome Statute, supra note 84, at art. 7(1)(k).
97.
Id.
98.
See WEISSBRODT & DE LA VEGA, supra note 78, at 226.
99.
See id.
100.
IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 318 (5th ed. 1998).
101.
Id.
102.
Id.
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uge.103 However, there is no binding duty upon states to extradite because
of a mere request by another state.104 Nevertheless, states may assume a
binding obligation to extradite by becoming a party to a treaty; these treaties usually have some terms and conditions, such as a fair trial guarantee.105
B.

THE DUTY TO EXTRADITE OR PROSECUTE: A NON-DEROGABLE NORM

It has also been said that states have a duty to extradite or prosecute in
international law, or aut dedere aut judicare, which has been viewed by the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) as rising to the level of jus cogens.106
Separate from general extradition law, jus cogens is a peremptory rule of
international law upon which no derogation is possible.107 A jus cogens
principle is so potent that it invalidates any treaty that contradicts it, including the U.N. Charter, and is analogous to a kind of modern natural law.108
The formation and acceptance of jus cogens internationally is largely due to
the Nazi atrocities committed during the Second World War.109 More recently, for example, the Ninth Circuit in Siderman de Blake v. Republic of
Argentina held that the right to be free from torture has the highest status
under international law, meaning it was a jus cogens principle.110
Moreover, the widespread use of the duty to extradite or prosecute,
carried out, either explicitly or implicitly, by states, as well as the sheer
number of state signatories to numerous conventions incorporating aut dedere aut judicare duties, attests to the existing jus cogens duty to extradite.111
For example, the dissenting judges in Libya v. United Kingdom (an IJC case
involving the Lockerbie incident discussed in the Introduction to this article) supported this proposition and declared that aut dedere aut judicare is

103.
Harvard Research Draft in International Law on Extradition, 29 AM. J. INT’L.
L. SUPP. 32 at 34 (1935); see BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 665 (9th ed. 2009).
104.
BROWNLIE, supra note 100, at 318.
105.
Id.; see also G.A. Res. 45/116, U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/116 (Dec. 14, 1990).
106.
See Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom), Provisional Measures, 1992 I.C.J. 3 (Apr. 14) (dissenting opinions of Judges ElKosheri, Bedjaoui, Ajibola, & Weeramantry), available at http://www.icjcij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3&k=9c&case=88&code=luk&p3=3.
107.
See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 53, May 23, 1969, U.N.T.S
vol. 1155 at 331; MARK JANUS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 62-66 (4th ed.
2003).
108.
JANUS, supra note 107, at 62, 64.
109.
Id. at 63.
110.
Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 717 (9th Cir. 1992).
111.
See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI & EDWARD M. WISE , AUT DEDERE AUT JUDICARE:
THE DUTY TO EXTRADITE OR PROSECUTE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 51-57 (1995).
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an internationally recognized right of states. In his dissent, Judge Ajibola
wrote,
I am of the view that based on the 1971 Montreal Convention, Libya has a legal right to protect. [Aut dedere aut judicare] is a right recognized in international law and even
considered by some jurists as jus cogens. I share the view
of some of my colleagues, especially Judge Weeramantry,
that Libya is entitled to prosecute the two accused Libyans
if she wants.112
Regional arrangements in South Asia, Europe, and throughout the world
similarly uphold aut dedere aut judicare.113
C.

IGNORING THE DUTY TO EXTRADITE OR PROSECUTE

Despite aut dedere aut judicare and its often-ignored status as jus cogens, states have habitually disregarded this international duty.114 The
112.
Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention
Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom),
1992 I.C.J. 3, 82 (Apr. 14) (dissenting opinion of Judge Ajibola), available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/88/7105.pdf.
113.
See, e.g., SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism arts. I, II,
VI, SOUTH ASIAN ASSOC. FOR REG’L. COOPERATION (Nov. 4, 1987), http://www.saarcsec.org/userfiles/Various%20Publications,%20Agreements,MOUs,%20%20Conventions.%2
0Charters/PUBLICATIONS/Pdf/SAARC%20REGIONAL%20CONVENTION%20ON%20
SUPPRESSION%20OF%20TERRORISM.pdf (“A Contracting State in whose territory an
alleged offender is found shall upon receiving a request for extradition from another Contracting state, take appropriate measures, subject to its national laws, so as to ensure his
presence for purposes of extradition or prosecution.”); Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation art. 7, 8, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565,
974 U.N.T.S. 178 (“The Contracting State in the territory of which the alleged offender is
found shall, if it does not extradite him, be obliged, without exception whatsoever and
whether or not the offense was committed in its territory, to submit the case to its competent
authorities for the purpose of prosecution.”); Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation art. 3 , Feb. 24, 1988, 974
U.N.T.S. 177 (“Each Contracting State shall likewise take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offenses . . . in the case where the alleged offender
is present in its territory and it does not extradite him . . . .”); Convention for the Suppression
of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation art. 10, Mar. 1, 1992, 1678
U.N.T.S. 221 (“The State Party in the territory of which the offender or the alleged offender
is found shall, in cases to which article 6 applies, if it does not extradite him, be obliged,
without exception whatsoever and whether or not the offence was committed in its territory,
to submit the case without delay to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution,
through proceedings in accordance with the laws of that State.”).
114.
See Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom), Provisional Measures, 1992 I.C.J. 3, 82 (Apr. 14) (dissenting opinions of El-Kosheri,
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Lockerbie incident is but one example.115 For nearly fifteen years, Libya
and its leader Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi refused to hand over its nationals accused of terrorist bombings to foreign courts by asserting they had jurisdiction over the matter; the issue was even brought before the ICJ.116 While
Libya’s claims of jurisdiction were possibly true, initially Libya nevertheless failed to prosecute its own nationals for crimes likely sanctioned or
supported by Qadhafi and his regime.117 These actions violated the international duty to extradite or prosecute, resulting in de facto impunity for these
criminals; there were also serious issues that Libya, as a state-sponsor of the
terrorist Lockerbie bombings, was unable to conduct a fair trial against its
nationals even if it wished to.118 In fact, some have suggested that Libya
likely agreed to pay monetary compensation to the Lockerbie victims not
from some general notion of duty under international law, but only after the
United States discovered it had designs for a nuclear program and exerted
considerable pressure on Libya.119 However, for years, while Libya violated
the jus cogens norm of aut dedere aut judicare, those responsible for the
terrorist attacks were essentially given impunity.120
Whether a state simply does not wish to prosecute or extradite suspected criminals, or whether a state refuses to extradite over concerns for
human rights, such a state can and often does ignore its non-derogable, jus
cogens duty – aut dedere aut judicare.121 The result is, in effect, granting
accused or convicted individuals impunity for their crimes.122 Part of the
problem is that states typically do not have jurisdiction to try cases over
events happening outside their borders involving foreign nationals.123 The
primary exception to this lack of jurisdiction is crimes falling under univerBedjaoui,
Ajibola,
&
Weeramantry),
available
at
http://www.icjcij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3&k=9c&case=88&code=luk&p3=3.
115.
See id. at 82.
116.
See id.
117.
Reynolds, supra note 25.
118.
Libya Accepts Lockerbie Blame, BBC NEWS, Feb. 25, 2004,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3487562.stm.; Madeline Morris, Terrorism: The Politics of
Prosecution, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 405, 407 (2005).
119.
Elise Labott, U.S., Libya Deal Closes Book on Lockerbie, CNN NEWS (Aug. 14,
2008), http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/africa/08/14/lockerbie/index.html.
120.
Id.
121.
Boyd, supra note 22, at 2-7; S.C. Res. 731, supra note 27; S.C. Res. 748 ¶ 1-14,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/748 (Mar. 31, 1992).
122.
Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention
Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom),
Provisional Measures, 1992 I.C.J. 3, 82 (Apr. 14) (dissenting opinions of El-Kosheri, Bedjaoui,
Ajibola,
&
Weeramantry),
available
at
http://www.icjcij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3&k=9c&case=88&code=luk&p3=3.
123.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE U.S. §
401 cmt. 23 (1987) (explaining jurisdiction to prescribe and jurisdiction to enforce).
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sal jurisdiction, such as crimes against humanity or war crimes.124 The remainder of this Article will explain what universal jurisdiction is, and display how using universal jurisdiction will lead to greater peace and security
by ending impunity.
IV.
A.

UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION

DEFINING UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION

A state typically requires two kinds of jurisdiction to prosecute a person: jurisdiction to prescribe and jurisdiction to enforce.125 Jurisdiction to
prescribe is “the authority of a state to make its substantive laws applicable
to particular persons and circumstances.”126 Jurisdiction to enforce is the
state’s power to “enforce law against particular persons or in particular circumstances.”127 Jurisdiction to enforce is usually fairly straightforward and
easy to prove because states have the right to prosecute those present within
their sovereign borders.128 Jurisdiction to prescribe, however, is more complex.
Jurisdiction to prescribe can be based on five principles: (1) territoriality, where the actions in question happened in the prosecuting state; (2)
nationality, where the suspect is a national of the prosecuting state; (3) protective, where the actions in question so severely injure the prosecuting
state that its vital interests are threatened; (4) passive personality, where the
victim is a national of the prosecuting state; and (5) universality, where all
states are allowed to prosecute an individual without regard to territoriality
or the nationality of the victim or suspect.129
Jurisdiction to prescribe is often much more difficult to overcome, but
many courts have found the required jurisdiction to prescribe for crimes
falling under universal jurisdiction.130 Universal jurisdiction is the right of a
prosecuting state to have the jurisdiction to prescribe regardless of where

124.
See Thomas J. Sponsler, The Universality Principle of Jurisdiction and the
Threatened Trials of American Airmen, 15 LOY. L. REV. 43, 49-50 (1969).
125.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE U.S. § 401
cmt. 23 (1987).
126.
Id.
127.
Id.
128.
James D. Fry, Comment, Terrorism as a Crime Against Humanity and Genocide: The Backdoor to Universal Jurisdiction, 7 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 169, 173
(2002).
129.
Id.
130.
See Beth Van Schaack, In Defense of Civil Redress: The Domestic Enforcement
of Human Rights Norms in the Context of the Proposed Hague Judgments Convention, 42
HARV. INT’L L.J. 141, 145, 147-153 (2001).
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the events in question occurred or the nationality of the persons involved.131
The types of crimes falling under universal jurisdiction are acts “so repugnant to society that all states have an interest and the authority to arrest and
prosecute the perpetrators of that specific heinous act. Any state that can get
custody over these individuals can prosecute them.”132
The beginning of universal jurisdiction can be traced back to acts of
piracy.133 Pirates would commit their violent acts and then hastily sail out of
jurisdiction, leaving the victim state in quite a dilemma.134 The United
States Supreme Court, for example, in United States v. Smith, held that pirates were “hostes humani generis,” or enemies of all mankind, and therefore liable to be punished by all nations.135 More modern examples of universal jurisdiction took place with the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals for
war crimes after the Second World War, which expanded this type of jurisdiction to include war crimes and crimes against humanity.136 Since 1940,
universal jurisdiction has expanded even more to include slave trading,
drug trafficking, and torture.137
Several European states have adopted universal jurisdiction in their
domestic laws.138 Belgium, for example, passed a law that allows for the
prosecution of Geneva Convention offenders as well as those who commit
crimes against humanity and genocide.139 Belgium has also used universal
jurisdiction to investigate and sometimes indict individuals such as Ariel

131.
See Madeline H. Morris, Universal Jurisdiction in a Divided World: Conference
Remarks, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 337, 337 (2001).
132.
Fry, supra note 128, at 174.
133.
See Michael P. Scharf, Application of Treaty-Based Universal Jurisdiction to
Nationals of Non-Party States, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 363, 369 (2001).
134.
See Morris, Universal Jurisdiction, supra note 131, at 339-340; DANIEL
BODANSKY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION IN WORLD JUSTICE? U.S. COURTS
AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 1-22 (Mark Gibney ed. 1991).
135.
United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153, 156 (1820).
136.
See Thomas J. Sponsler, The Universality Principle of Jurisdiction and the
Threatened Trials of American Airmen, 15 LOY. L. REV. 43, 49-50 (1969).
137.
Scharf, supra note 133, at 372-73; BROWNLIE, supra note 100, at 306. This list
is not exhaustive.
138.
See Van Schaack, supra note 130, at 144.
139.
See id. at 145 (citing Loi du 16 juin 1993 relative a la repression des infractions
grave aux Conventions internationals de Geneve du 12 auot 1949 et aux Protocoles I et II du
8 juin 1977, additionnels a ces Conventions, Moniteur Belge art. 1, 7, Aug. 5, 1993, p.
17751 (Belg.) (translation: Law of June 16, 1993 relating to the punishment of the grave
offenses of the Geneva Conventions and Protocols II and II of June 8, 1977 and additional
Conventions) and citing Loi du 20 fevrier 1999 relative a lat repression de violations grave
du droit international humanitaire, Moniteur Belge, Mar. 23 1999, 9286 (Belg.)) (translation:
Law of February 20, 1999 relating to the punishment of grave offenses of international human rights) (stating Belgium courts have jurisdiction for offenses committed under this act,
such as torture, regardless of where the offenses take place).

2011]

THE AGE OF IMPUNITY

99

Sharon, Yasser Arafat, Henry Kissinger, Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani,
Fidel Castro, and Saddam Hussein.140
Recently, universal jurisdiction has been invoked for extraditing Chilean General Augusto Pinochet to Spain,141 for Israel’s ability to convict
Adolf Eichmann for his crimes against the Jews in the Holocaust142 and for
the United States’s decision in Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky to extradite a former
Nazi death camp guard to Israel because he was considered an enemy of all
people.143 Today, crimes against humanity, war crimes, crimes of genocide,
and torture usually fall under universal jurisdiction whereby any state may
launch prosecutions into these offenses regardless of the accused’s nationality or territoriality.144
B.

UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION AND THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT

Universal jurisdiction is necessary because no international tribunal
currently has jurisdiction to hear every international law case.145 The ICC,
for example, has several limits on the kinds of cases that can be brought
before it.146 First, it can only hear cases concerning genocide, war crimes,
crimes of aggression, or crimes against humanity.147 Terrorism was intentionally excluded from this list due in large part to international disagreement on the definition of terrorism.148 Second, the ICC may only hear a
case if the crime was committed on the sovereign territory of a state party to
or by a national of such a state party to the Rome Statute.149 Third, the ICC
would only have jurisdiction if the Security Council specifically refers the
case.150 Fourth, the ICC is a court of last resort, and therefore it could only
140.
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have jurisdiction if a state is unable or unwilling to investigate and prosecute these criminals.151 Lastly, the ICC may only prosecute those most responsible for the crimes falling under its jurisdiction.152 Consequently, a
great many offenders would never see the inside of a courtroom if the world
community solely relied on the ICC.
C.

TERRORISM AS A CRIME FIT FOR UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION

As mentioned above, terrorism in particular is hotly contested, with
many clamoring for its inclusion as a crime against humanity or a war
crime.153 Yet, the ICC has not explicitly claimed jurisdiction over this offense.154 There are essentially two main arguments for extending universal
jurisdiction to acts of terrorism.155 The first is that all states have an interest
in securing international peace and security, which terrorism threatens, and
therefore all states should be able to prosecute accused terrorists.156 The
second is that third-party states provide a more neutral ground for prosecuting terrorists, which often involve political matters.157
Universal jurisdiction is still needed in the international community,
and not even the ICC hears every case that it can or possibly should.158 The
sometimes crabbed definitions of what constitutes crimes against humanity,
war crimes, and jurisdiction in general, allow accused criminals who fail to
meet the high threshold set by the ICC and other courts to be given impunity. Terrorist acts, like the events surrounding the Lockerbie bombings, are
illustrative of this problem.159 This unjust result goes against the international community’s interest in holding criminals accountable for their
crimes and securing international peace and security.160 The remainder of
this article will propose a novel solution to this problem.
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USING THE DUTY TO EXTRADITE OR PROSECUTE AND UNIVERSAL
JURISDICTION TO END IMPUNITY FOR ACTS OF TERRORISM

Having shown that there exists a comprehensive definition of terrorism, that terrorism should be counted as a crime against humanity or a war
crime, that universal jurisdiction encompasses terrorism, and that states are
under a jus cogens duty to extradite or prosecute, the question then becomes, what happens now? And how can these interrelated concepts be
linked together to end impunity for acts of terrorism once and for all?
First, the international community must adopt the definition of terrorism with all due haste. The definition presented in this article is a concise
definition derived from the U.N. Proposed Comprehensive Convention on
International Terrorism:161 the unlawful, intentional killing, intentional
causing of serious bodily harm, or intentional causing of serious damage to
public and/or private property for the purpose of intimidating the public or
compelling a state’s government to pursue, or not pursue, a certain course
of conduct.162 This would be an adequate definition that the international
community could likely agree on and take the appropriate reservations to
whenever necessary.163 Defining terrorism is important because an act cannot be a crime fit for any jurisdiction, let alone universal jurisdiction, unless
and until it has an accepted definition.
Second, having agreed on what terrorism is, the international community should acknowledge that terrorism easily fits into the category of a
crime against humanity or a war crime.164 Third, because terrorism is a
crime against humanity or a war crime depending on the situation, the international community must recognize that states may exercise universal
jurisdiction against suspected terrorists.165 Fourth, states must recognize and
abide by their duty to extradite or prosecute internationally wrongful acts
like terrorism, understanding that this duty is jus cogens, or nonderogable.166 Because states have this non-derogable duty to extradite or
prosecute, they must complete this international obligation against suspected terrorists wherever they are found by either extraditing or prosecuting the accused.167 Moreover, because terrorism is a crime against humanity
161.
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or a war crime, states are capable of prosecuting suspected terrorists under
universal jurisdiction if extradition proves impossible, such as when the
receiving state uses the death penalty or there is no extradition agreement in
place between the states involved.168 As a result, by using this framework, it
becomes clear that terrorists worldwide will not be able to hide behind the
screen of impunity.
This approach is certainly novel. However, it is by linking the abovementioned concepts together that the end of impunity for acts of terrorism
can become realistic. Because acts of terrorism have been considered the
greatest threat to international peace today, the international community is
more pressed than ever to end impunity for acts of terrorism once and for
all.169 The framework mapped out in this section is but one way to achieve
this goal.
VI.

CONCLUSION

As evidenced by the events currently taking place in Kenya and by the
Lockerbie incident a generation ago, we live in an “age of impunity” that
poses a great many challenges to the international community’s approach to
the crime of terrorism.170 This article hopes to offer at least one possible
solution to this problem.
The international community must agree on a comprehensive definition of terrorism and, in doing so, categorize terrorism as a crime against
humanity or a war crime depending on the circumstances. Thereafter, universal jurisdiction should be applied to terrorism and these great offenders
of international peace and security must be prosecuted or extradited.171
Only by placing the duty to extradite or prosecute on states as a jus cogens
norm will terrorists like those involved in the Lockerbie bombings be fully
brought to justice. If the international community conceptualizes these legal
obligations in this way, it could accomplish a tremendous feat and may help
mark the end of impunity for these hostes humani generis, these enemies of
all mankind.172
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